THE EFFECT OF PRICE CONTROLS ON NON-PRICE
COMPETITION
WROE ALDERSON*

It has been said that the National Recovery Administration operated under a
law which gave it legislative, executive, and judicial functions. But in retrospect it
seems to have scarcely passed beyond the legislative pfiase in most of the matters
which came under its jurisdiction. The essential part of its record for the economist
is the record of the attempts to formulate policy in connection with the code-making
process. The NRA, which might have assumed historic importance as an effort to
operate under a new national economic policy, in practical effect resolved itself into
a great national forum for the Jiscussion of the elements of such a policy.
Questions of price control brought many divergent viewpoints into the national
forum. Economists were in general opposed to such measures. Business men were
much more divided in their opinions. But among these who favored some form of
price control there were large firms and small firms, advertisers and iio-advertiser.,
profitable and unprofitable concerns, manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers. I,
short it could not be sa) i that business men of this persuasion coiformed to any
particular type.
Arguments offered in favor of price control measures were of similar scope and
variety. Very frequently their logic rested more on social grounds than on economic.
An argument to which a number of economists listened with some sympathy was
the plea for the preservation of the small enterprise as a means of giving fuller
opportunities to individual initiative. An attempt was sometimes made to give this
view a more acceptable economic flavor by insisting on the essential nature of the
services performed by some of the firms which were on the verge of business failure.
If these firms were not permitted to survive, it was argued, great social costs might
be incurred in replacing them.
Similarly in the raw materials industries, such as coal and petroleum, the demand
for price control was frequently linked with the need for conserving natural resources. Both types of arguments stressed structural features of economic life. Thus
they created resistance and uneasiness in the minds of economists who preferred to
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telt all control measures by the principle of competitive equilibrium. For them a
measure was a bad measure if it seemed to create inelasticity by restricting competition. In recognizing the plea for the small enterprise or for the conservation of
natural resources they felt that they were practical men, making concessions which
could not be defended on wholly economic grounds.
Two approaches might have been taken in examining price control measures
with relation to the maintenance of competition. The first, an attempt to show that
the proposed form of control did not actually interfere with price flexibility, was
explored at some length in a number of code discussions. Particularly with regard
to arrangements allowing for minimum mark-ups to cover such functions as wholesaling and retailing and provisions designed to eliminate price discrimination, it
was argued that the basic price level would still move up and down as freely as
before. Such pleas were often presented on behalf of business groups by recognized
economists, and sometimes admitted for code-making purposes by equally eminent
economists engaged in advising the administration. Statistical price studies made
subsequently at several universities have contributed something to the substantiation
of this view.
But the other approach to a consideration of the effect of price control measures
received no clear statement during the NRA period. That approach is to analyze
the effect of price control on non-price forms of competition. Business men were
struggling for an enunciation of such a viewpoint in their discussions of destructive
price-cutting. The term "destructive price-cutting" was never given a clear-cut
definition either by business men or administrative officials. But if non-price competition is given a place of equal importance with price competition, destructive
price-cutting may be defined as that which destroys or seriously restricts non-price
forms of competition.
The four major factors in non-price competition are held to be:
(a) Improvement in quality and service.
(b) Differentiation of product.
(c) Consumer advertising.
(d) Trade promotion.
Of these four the first is most basic. It is practically always present as an element
in competition parallel to price competition, particularly in fabricated products. One
recent writer' states the view that the pressure of competition upward on quality is
equally significant with the pressure of competition downward upon price. To some
economists the emphasis upon competition in quality lies in the direction of semimonopoly and is likely to interfere with the attainment of competitive equilibrium.1
To the present writer it seems doubtful whether under our present form of industrial
organization a true competitive equilibrium can be attained at all unless quality
competition and price competition are equally vigorous. The full employment of
'Montgomery, The Consumer Looks at Distribution (Jan. 1937) J. oF
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productive resources depends on the quality of the product turned out as well as upon
the number of units produced. Full employment of resources does not occur until an
industry is making the best quality of product that the market will absorb in the
greatest number that the market will absorb. In theory, at least, there should be a
price for each type of product which will bring about this balance between quality
and number of units.
Further significance can then be offered for the term "destructive price cutting"
which is so frequently heard in trade circles. It would mean the establishment of
prices so low as to discourage the full employment of the industry's resources by
necessitating cuts in the quality of the product offered. There might be some instances in which a definitely fixed price would be justifiable in these terms. In other
words there might be products on which the definite fixing of the price would cause
competition in quality to raise the actual value of the product up to a point that
would justify that price. Such an argument would of course have to contemplate a
degree of economic wisdom on the part of the agency fixing the price which is not
always possessed either by public price-fixing bodies or by individual concerns in
setting a price on their products.
But purely for purposes of analysis it may be worthwhile to assume for a moment
that such a price has been fixed on a given product and to consider the various competitive devices which would tend to raise the marginal costs of the product to the
level of the price so fixed. Improving the quality of the product has already been
mentioned, but let us suppose that possible improvements in the product itself had
been exhausted long before the level of the fixed price had been reached.
The next factor which would probably come into play would be the offering of
various services accompanying the product. This might take the form of installation
service or guarantees of quality in the case of durable products, or palatial retail
establishments and liberal credit and delivery policies in the case of consumer goods.
Both classes of service have in fact been widely offered. But let us further assume
that all avenues had been exhausted for elaborating either the quality or the service
features of the transaction.
The next type of non-price competition which is likely to be adopted lies in the
direction of product differentiation. Product differentiation has been discussed by
Chamberlin2 and others as a semi-monopolistic attempt to escape from price competition. The alternative view is offered here that product differentiation may be
looked upon as an attempt to extend quality competition. Suppose, for example,
that the basic quality dimension of the product is durability. In a given case the
possibility of rendering the product more durable may have been exhausted before
costs have been raised to the fixed price of the product. Also it may be that, after
that point has been reached, the customers for the product may be considered to be
divided into groups according to their interest in other quality dimensions such as
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appearance and convenience in use. Additional increases in quality might then
occur but with a different phase being stressed in each of the several groups. It
might be assumed that the result of competition would then be to close the gap
remaining between cost and the fixed price by making equivalent additions to value
along different quality dimensions rather than making identical improveme-nts along
the same quality dimension.
Under this analysis product differentiation would not move away from competition but would be one means of maximizing the supply of equivalent utilities offered
in the product at the fixed price. The final competitive means of raising cost to the
fixed price would lie in increasing expenditures for sales promotion. Sales costs are
the most elastic elements in costs. Since sales costs are subject to operating decisions in the most competitive of industries, economists have experienced difficulty
in relating sales costs to the standard analysis of the competitive equilibrium. In
relation to the hypothetical example in which the sales price is assumed to be fixed,
the flexibility of sales costs is the final element necessary to the attainment of equilibrium in non-price competition. Such an increase in sales cost should not be considered as wholly lacking in social utility. Every improvement in quality and every
product differentiation will require additional selling effort to acquaint the consumer
with such improvements. The new aspect of quality will not prove wholly effective
in use without consumer understanding of its advantages. On the other hand, it is
difficuli to increase sales costs beyond the minimum required by the routine movement of goods without something special of a quality nature to be sold.
It is probable then that neither of the two basic elements in non-price competition would ever be wholly lacking. That is to say that the increase in cost upward
toward the fixed price would always combine the two elements of quality improvement and additional sales costs in some proportion. Whether the actual increase in
the utility offered to the consumer would be in proportion to the increase in the price
will not be considered in detail here.
There would always be additional factors beyond those which have been suggested bearing on the question of how much real utility would be given at the fixed
price. In the first place the question is scarcely capable of solution in exact mathematical terms when several dissimilar quality dimensions are involved in the same
cost-raising process. Another factor is the effect on the price of labor and raw
materials entering into the product which would result from quality competition
and tend to diminish the value which the consumer would receive at the fixed price.
It would, however, have the social value of increasing the disbursements of purchasing power to labor and raw material suppliers. Counterbalancing this tendency
would be the elimination of marginal firms by quality competition resulting in a
higher average efficiency among the remaining suppliers, and presumably a greater
ablity to provide quality in the product.
The increase in the cost of selling has been treated so far as a single element. It
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may now be considered in terms of its two major components, namely the consumer
education usually carried on by means of advertising and the trade cooperation
which the manufacturer seeks to obtain by means of the margins which he allows
to retailers and wholesalers. The manufacturer's use of these two forms of sales
effort will differ in any number of respects in accordance with the types of price
control which are in effect.
The remainder of the discussion can best be developed in terms of the probable
effect on these two elements of sales costs of the various price control situations
which may arise under recent legislation, namely the Robinson-Patman Act and
the state "fair trade" laws. Three control situations will be considered for the
purpose of analysis although there are many other variations which may arise in
practice. These three situations may be designated as Situations A, B, and C, as
follows:
Situation A-Strict enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act but general tendency of
manufacturers not to issue contracts under the "fair trade" laws.
Situation B-General use of resale price contracts establishing margins satisfactory to the
retailer with the Robinson-Patman Act permitted to become a dead letter.
Situation C-Full use of both forms of control.
In the first instance where prices were controlled at the top but not at the bottom
the tendency would be both to equalize competition among retailers and at the same
time to intensify it. Strict enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act would mean the
elimination of any discriminatory advantage in buying which may have been available to the larger retail organizations. Such concerns, in order to hold their position
in the market, would use all of the competitive devices available to them in attempting to maintain retail volume. Price competition would continue in undiminished
force but quality and service features would also receive increasing emphasis. The
small retailer would be enabled to meet the price competition of the larger organization and the larger organization would be obliged to meet the quality and service
competition of the independent retailer.
Under Situation B, with prices controlled at the bottom but open at the top, price
competition between retailers would be restricted without an .equalizatibn of competitive advantages on the buying side. The probable result would be a marked
increase in quality and service elements in the competitive efforts of the large retail
organizations. But it is likely that only a minor part of the new service elements to
be introduced would take the form of service to the consumer. The power to demand price concessions from the manufacturer has been associated in the past with
the capacity to offer special services to the manufacturer. In other words, the retailer
normally offers to take over certain sales and promotion functions, which the manufacturer might perform in other cases, in return for the special price concessions.
Such concessions would no doubt tend to be increased, with an increasing portion
of the manufacturer's budget for advertising and promotion expended in the form
of concessions to retail organizations who undertook to promote his product for him.
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Under Situation C, with control of price both at the top and the bottom, the
tendency would be to equalize competition among retailers and at the same time
center the resulting competition upon quality and service features. While price
appeal might remain as an element of retail merchandising in such aspects as odd
cent pricing and occasional special sales, the ability of one section of the retail trade
to profit at the expense of another by means of loss-leader selling would practically
disappear. The large retail organization would lose both the special price concessions which make it easier to create price reductions and the privilege of accepting
margins lower than the minimums satisfactory to other retailers. Expensive store
atmosphere and elaborate consumer service would no doubt be expanded presendy
by the larger retail organizations.
In assaying the comparative effect of these three situations upon the manufacturer's use of consumer advertising, it is necessary to take account of two aspects of
the manufacturer's advertising policy. The first aspect may be called the strategic
aspect. This term is meant to characterize the considerations governing the manufacturer's choice between methods of sales promotion. The effect of a control situation on the strategic aspect of advertising policy would be to increase or decrease
the manufacturer's desire to use advertising in contrast with other methods.
The second aspect of policy may be called the budgetary aspect. The effect of a
control situation on the budgetary aspect is to increase or decrease the amount of
funds which the manufacturer has available for use in such promotional efforts as
advertisirkg.
The probable effect of the three price control situations on advertising expenditures may now be described in terms of these two phases of advertising policy.
Situation A (prices controlled at the top and open at the bottom) would be
favorable to an increase in advertising expenditures for both strategic and budgetary
reasons. On the strategic side the manufacturer would now lack the special efforts
which large retailers had made in return for price concessions and at the same time
would need to overcome any trade resistance arising from the unrestricted price
cutting to which his product might be subjected. On the budgetary side large
amounts of money would be made available for advertising use by wiping out the
special arrangements that may previously have existed with large retailers. In this
connection it must be remembered that the Robinson-Patman Act proceeds in two
major directions. The first is the elimination of discrimination by requiring that
quantity discount schedules be related to relative costs of serving different customers.
The second is by directly limiting the use of such promotional devices as advertising
allowances and payments to retailers for demonstrators.
While Situation A is the most favorable of the three to increased advertising
expenditures, Situation B (prices controlled at the bottom and open at the top)
would be the least favorable. In this case both strategic and budgetary considerations
would weigh against the use of advertising. This situation would give the large
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retailer a preponderant place in the control of distribution so that the manufacturer's
efforts would be directed even more than before toward cultivating the good-will
of such leading retail organizations. The budget available for advertising would be
decreased by diversion both to the protected margins granted to all retailers and the
promotional allowances granted to the larger organizations.
The effect of Situation C (prices controlled at both top and bottom) would be
moderately favorable to the increase of advertising expenditures, particularly in the
more selective advertising media. Strategic considerations would be favorable to
advertising and budgetary considerations moderately unfavorable. With the
equalization of competition in the retail field and the better retail relations resulting
from protected margins, a greater number of manufacturers than ever before would
find the situation favorable to putting most of their sales promotion effort into
advertising.
On the other hand, the granting of protected margins to the retailer would tend
to decrease the advertising budget of some of the manufacturers who had previously
been advertising. Such decreases would probably 'more than offset the savings which
they effected by withdrawing promotional allowances to retail organizations. Manufacturers would then be confronted with the need for getting increased advertising
effectiveness out of their advertising expenditure because of some decrease in price
flexibility resulting from protected margins for the retailer. Generally speaking they
would have to obtain this increased advertising effectiveness on the same or somewhat decreased advertising budgets. The apparent result would be to cause manufacturers to examine the character of their advertising expenditures more closely
than ever before and to make very rigorous selection of advertising media. More
complete data would be demanded from all advertising media as to the character
of the markets they reach and more detailed facts supporting their claims for advertising effectiveness. Thus the price control situation, while creating a more secure
place for quality competition in the product itself, would at the same time intensify
quality competition among the advertising media through which the product was
to be merchandised.
Other types of legislation for the control of distribution are under consideration.
Any type that will be introduced will change the control situation and call for a
modification of the analysis of the results. One such possibility is further government
control of quality in certain fields such as the proposed revision of the Food and
Drugs Act. Various measures for the control of quality will react in various ways
on both quality competition and price competition. Perhaps the one clear conclusion
that may be drawn from this attempt to analyze the effect of price control on nonprice competition is the need for paying attention to the total situation. That is to
say that it is not feasible to consider separately the possible effect of such measures
as the Robinson-Patman Act or the state "fair irade" laws. The probable result
must be considered in terms of the combination of control measures which are
actually effective at a given time.

